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This paper examines the relationship between wage rates and the racial composition of jobs,
using large cross-sectional and longitudinal samples constructed from monthly Current Population
Surveys for 1983–92. Support is found for a "quality sorting" model that posits an equilibrium in
which the racial composition of jobs serves as a skill index of unmeasured labor quality. Estimation
of standard wage-level equations shows that wages of both black and white workers are substantially
lower in occupations with a high density of blacks. Consistent with the quality sorting hypothesis, the
magnitude of the relationship is reduced sharply after accounting for occupational skill measures.
Longitudinal wage-change estimates controlling for person-specific quality indicate little if any causal
effect of racial composition on wages. Estimates of racial discrimination are reduced only moderately
after accounting for racial composition; unexplained differentials occur within occupations or reflect
inter-occupational differences uncorrelated with racial composition and occupational skill measures.Wages, Racial Composition, and Quality Sorting in Labor Markets
I. INTRODUCTION
In contrast to the considerable effort given to the study of racial wage differentials and labor
market discrimination, scant attention has been paid to how wages vary with the racial composition of
jobs. A recent paper by Hirsch and Schumacher (1992) concludes that wages for both white and black
workers are significantly lower in industry-occupation-region groups with a high proportion of black
workers.
1 They argue that their results are not easily explained by standard statistical discrimination
models, the crowding hypothesis, or taste theories of discrimination. They propose what they refer to
as a "quality sorting" explanation, but provide no direct evidence. A quality sorting equilibrium
implies that the proportion of black workers in a job is correlated with measured and unmeasured labor
productivity differences. Lower-quality white and black workers are sorted into jobs with a relatively
large proportion of black workers, while higher quality white and black workers sort into jobs with a
small proportion of black workers. Wages vary with the racial density of jobs, independent of the race
or measured characteristics of individual workers. Such an equilibrium is likely to have arisen as a
result of past and present employment discrimination.
This paper outlines alternative variants of a quality sorting model. The model is evaluated
through the estimation of wage-level and wage-change equations examining the relationship between
wages and racial composition. We conclude that the racial composition of occupations is an important
and typically neglected correlate of wages, but that it serves primarily as an index of otherwise
unmeasured occupational and worker skills and not as a causal determinant of wages.
Our study is noteworthy for the size and quality of the assembled data sets. We develop an
unusually large longitudinal data base from the January 1983 through December 1992 monthly
Outgoing Rotation Group files of the Current Population Surveys (CPS ORG). Additional data
sources used in the paper include the 1973–78 May CPS files, the CPS ORG files for 1979–82, March2
CPS files for 1983–92, the five January CPS Displaced Worker Surveys (DWS) between 1984 and
1992, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and various supplements to the CPS (from the DOT and
the CPS supplements we derive variables pertaining to job characteristics).
Section II of the paper develops alternative variants of the simple quality sorting model and
outlines the empirical strategy designed to evaluate it. Section III follows with a description of data
sources and a presentation of descriptive evidence on the racial wage gap and occupational segregation
during the 1973–92 period. In Section IV, we present empirical results from the estimation of wage-
level equations and examine issues of specification, functional form, and differences in racial
composition effects across different worker groups. Section V presents evidence from wage-change
equations using three alternative panel data sets. A concluding section evaluates the study’s findings.
II. QUALITY SORTING, WAGES, AND RACIAL COMPOSITION
A. A Simple Model
In the model of quality sorting that follows, we distinguish between quality that is measured
(unmeasured) and quality that is observed (unobserved). Measured quality is that reflected in
productivity-related characteristics in the researcher’s information set (years of schooling, age, etc.),
while unmeasured quality cannot be directly measured. Observed quality refers to that known to
employers, whereas unobserved quality is not known to employers at the time of hire, but may become
known over time.
Employers and workers are sorted on the basis of observed and unobserved quality. Racial
composition, measured by the proportion of black workers in a job (B), will be negatively correlated
with white and black wage rates under several scenarios. A simple model illustrates the key points.
Workers are either high or low quality, and their marginal revenue products are represented by H or L.
Let Pb and Pw represent the proportions of black and white workers with productivity H, and (1-Pb)3
and (1-Pw) the proportions with productivity L. Assume initially that individual productivities are
independent of the place of work and that workers are paid their marginal products. The
economy-wide average productivities or wages of black and white workers, Vb and Vw respectively,
are
(1) Vb =P bH + (1-Pb)L,
(2) Vw =P wH + (1-Pw)L.
The productivity or wage differential between white and black workers is
(3) Vw -V b =( P w-Pb)(H-L).
The sign of the racial wage gap is determined by the sign of (Pw-Pb), and the magnitude of the gap is a
function of differences in the proportions of high-quality workers and in productivity between high-
and low-quality workers.
The average productivity and, by assumption, the average wage in an integrated workplace is
(4) V = BVb + (1-B)Vw
= B[PbH + (1-Pb)L] + (1-B)[PwH + (1-Pw)L],
where B represents the proportion of workers who are black. Following expansion, and the
cancellation and rearrangement of terms, we obtain
(5) V = (PbB-PwB)(H-L) + Pw(H-L) + L.
If the proportion of white and black workers of high and low quality are equal (Pw=Pb), the first term
cancels out and average wages in a workplace are independent of B.I f P w-Pb>0 then the average wage
will decrease with respect to B.
We sketch out four variants of this model. In each case assume that Pw-Pb>0. Variants one
and two assume that Pb and Pw do not vary with B across jobs, although jobs with a low B will have
more H workers owing to Pw-Pb>0. We conclude below that variants one and two are too simplistic
and do not explain extant evidence. In the first variant, assume that all workers are paid according to4
their individual productivities and that there is no unmeasured quality. Variant one predicts that
average wages across jobs decrease with respect to B, absent controls. No relationship between
individual wages and B (or between individual wages and race) would exist, however, after controlling
for measurable worker characteristics.
Variant two assumes that there is unmeasured quality, but no unobserved quality. Employers
(but not researchers) know each worker’s productivity and pay a wage H or L accordingly. In this
case, not only are average wages across jobs negatively related to B, but also individual wages are
negatively related to B after accounting for measurable characteristics other than race. Inclusion of a
race dummy (or estimation of separate regressions by race) would eliminate this relationship, however,
since information on individual race would capture (on average but with individual error) both (H-L)
and differences in the probabilities of being H or L for white and black workers. The finding that
wages decrease significantly with respect to B for both white and black workers, following inclusion
of detailed controls, permits rejection of variants one and two.
Variant three of the model provides what we believe is a more realistic approximation of the
labor market. It retains the assumption that individual productivities are observed by employers, but
allows Pb and Pw to increase across jobs as B decreases. That is, the proportion of black and white
workers who are of high quality increases as the proportion of black workers in an occupation
decreases. An employer who can observe worker productivity and chooses to hire a high-skill labor
force (due, say, to the firm’s technology) selects both a relatively lower proportion of black workers
than in the average workplace (since Pw-Pb>0), and a higher than average proportion of H quality black
and white workers. Both black and white wages will decrease with respect to B, even following
control for measurable characteristics, since B captures unmeasured quality or selective hiring (i.e., the
higher proportion of H quality workers) in a labor market.5
Variant three of the quality sorting model would account for the negative correlation between
wages and B in a wage-level equation (Hirsch and Schumacher, 1992), since B serves as a quality
index for white and black workers. But it would not be consistent with such a correlation in a
longitudinal framework. If workers are paid based on observed individual productivity, changes in an
individual’s wage following a job change should be uncorrelated with changes in B. A zero
coefficient on DB in a wage-change equation would provide evidence consistent with variant three of
the quality sorting model, while a negative coefficient on DB would allow rejection of variant three of
the model.
Variant four of the quality sorting model leads to the prediction of a negative relationship
between white and black wages and B both in wage-level and wage-change equations. Rather than
assuming that a worker’s productivity H or L is fixed across jobs, let individual black and white
worker productivity vary such that productivity is higher in jobs with a lower B. That is, worker
productivity is determined by the worker and the job. In terms of the model, some black and white
workers who are L quality in occupations with a high B will be H quality in occupations with a lower
B. Worker quality may vary with the job because of optimal sorting on the basis of skill (this
conclusion follows strictly only if comparative advantage can be measured by a one-dimensional skill
index) or greater effort in jobs with higher average productivity. Note that a similar equilibrium might
arise if some portion of (but not all) worker quality remains unobservable to employers, so that worker
pay is a function of individual and group productivity. Variant four of the model leads to a prediction
of a negative relationship between the wage and B in both a wage-level and wage-change equation, for
white and black workers. That is, white and black workers switching to occupations with a lower B
can expect a wage increase, and vice versa. Estimation of levels and wage-change equations,
therefore, can distinguish between alternative variants of our model and permit inferences about the
type of quality sorting that is typical in labor markets.
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Existing models in the literature can be interpreted as special cases of the quality sorting
hypothesis. For example, Lang’s (1986) "language" model of discrimination may help explain the
relationship between racial composition and wages. In Lang’s model, black and white workers display
different language and communication patterns, and workers who do not acquire majority traits face a
labor market penalty necessary to compensate employers for higher communication costs. The
relatively large number of black and small number of white workers not acquiring majority language
patterns are crowded into job markets with a high B and wage penalties owing to high communication
costs between white workers and employers. Blacks who acquire majority language patterns receive a
return on these skills by being able to acquire jobs in predominantly white labor markets with lower
communication costs. The language model thus illustrates an example of quality sorting, with the
majority language pattern representing a quality attribute by which workers are sorted.
An extension of the language model yields an additional insight. Labor markets with a
relatively large number of black workers provide greater contact between blacks and whites and a
larger accumulated stock of communication capital (for related arguments in a historical context, see
Whatley, 1990). In this case, there exists a smaller penalty associated with minority language patterns
in labor markets with a relatively large number of minority workers (and employers). This implication
is consistent with the finding of smaller penalties associated with the racial density of an occupation
among workers with less schooling or who work in the South, and of a nonlinear relationship in which
the marginal wage effect of B declines with B.
This study’s emphasis on a quality sorting explanation for the relationship between wages and
racial composition does not rule out other explanations. As discussed by Hirsch and Schumacher
(1992), however, alternative explanations are not convincing. Discrimination resulting from employer,
employee, and consumer preferences may well have led to a quality sorting equilibrium in which
unmeasured (and perhaps unobserved) skills vary inversely with the proportion of blacks in an7
occupation.
3 Preference models of discrimination (Becker, 1971; Arrow, 1973), however, predict
either a positive relationship between white wages and B, or a widening racial gap as B increases.
Neither pattern is evident in the data. For example, employer discrimination implies either no wage
effects in markets with sufficient numbers of nondiscriminatory employers, or wage penalties for
blacks relative to whites in labor markets with large numbers of black workers. Widespread employee
discrimination implies a wage premium for white workers who work alongside black workers. And
consumer discrimination implies either employment segregation within and across occupations, or
wage differentials between white and black workers in similar jobs. The preference models do not
help account for systematically lower wage rates for white workers in jobs with relatively large
numbers of black workers.
Statistical discrimination models emphasize the role of imperfect information about individual
worker productivities; models differ in their implications about the effects of racial composition. The
Aigner-Cain model (see Cain, 1986) assumes an equal distribution of abilities among black and white
workers, while "indicator" characteristics (e.g., schooling) are less reliable measures of productivity for
blacks than for whites. In the Aigner-Cain model, there is no group discrimination. High-ability
whites are paid more than high-ability blacks and low-ability whites are paid less than low-ability
blacks, but average wages are equivalent. The model does not predict a relationship between average
white and black wages and B but, rather, that predominantly black workplaces exhibit lower wage
dispersion and lower returns to indicator variables than do predominantly white workplaces.
4
Likewise, alternative models of statistical discrimination do not appear to be fully consistent with
empirical evidence relating black and white wages to racial composition (Hirsch and Schumacher,
1992).
Occupational crowding, by which blacks are relegated to particular occupations and have
limited mobility, leads to lower wages in crowded occupations for blacks and whites alike, while8
leading to higher wages for both races in noncrowded occupations (Bergmann, 1971). Although
broadly consistent with the evidence of a negative relationship between B and white and black wages,
the crowding explanation is far from compelling, in no small part because the size of the black labor
force is relatively small. For crowding to occur, there must be a sizable black workforce and
employment discrimination must be the prevailing norm (such a description appears to apply to much
of the South prior to the mid-1960s). If crowding were the primary mechanism through which B is
currently correlated with wages, the effects of B should be strongest in occupations with a very high
proportion of black workers, in the South, and among workers with lower levels of schooling. If
anything, evidence indicates precisely the opposite—weaker effects at lower schooling levels and in
the South, and a nonlinear relationship between log wages and B whereby wages decrease with respect
to B at a decreasing rate.
B. Wages, Racial Composition, and Quality Sorting: Empirical Specification
The quality sorting hypothesis is examined through the estimation of wage-level and
wage-change equations. If racial composition serves as an occupational skill index, then the absolute
value of the coefficient on B should decrease as measurable skill-related variables are introduced into
the wage equation. These variables will measure skill directly and indirectly, since some skills not
explicitly measured are likely to be positively correlated with those dimensions of skill that are
measured. We will then estimate wage-change equations, in which unmeasured person-specific
differences in productivity fixed over time are netted out. If variant three of the quality sorting
hypothesis is correct, then the impact of a change in B on the log wage change should be substantially
smaller than the estimated effect in a levels equation, since the change model controls for unmeasured
person-specific skills correlated with B.9
More concretely, the relationship between wages and racial composition is estimated first in
levels by
(6) lnWitb = SbkbXiktb + QblnBitb + Fib + itb,
(7) lnWitw = SbkwXiktw + QwlnBitw +Fiw + itw,
where subscripts b and w designate black and white; lnWit is the natural log of hourly earnings for
individual i in year t; Xk consists of X1=1 and k-1 variables measuring personal and/or job
characteristics and region; bk includes a constant and k-1 coefficients corresponding to variables in X;
lnB is the natural log of the proportion of black to total employment in the worker’s detailed
occupation (alternative measures of B are discussed subsequently); Q is the coefficient on lnB
representing an elasticity of wages with respect to B; Fi is an unmeasured person-specific fixed effect
invariant over time (a one-year period in most of our models); and is an error term with zero mean
and constant variance. A value of Q<0 implies that wages decrease with respect to B, ceteris paribus,
while Q>0 implies the opposite. The quality sorting hypothesis implies that estimates of Q will
become less negative as measures of occupational skill are introduced explicitly into the wage
equation.
Estimation of the wage equation in levels will not account directly for unmeasured worker-
specific quality differences. If the omitted fixed effect Fi is negatively correlated with lnB,a st h e
quality sorting model implies, then levels estimates of Qw and Qb in (6) and (7) will be downward
biased (away from zero). Omitted fixed effects associated with quality sorting may be accounted for
by estimating wage-change equations. Letting D represent changes between adjacent years [t-(t-1)],
[(t-1)-(t-2)], etc., the following longitudinal equations are obtained:
(8) DlnWiyb = SbkbDXikyb + QbDlnBiyb + D ’iyb,
(9) DlnWiyw = SbkwDXikyw + QwDlnBiyw + D ’iyw,10
where y represents one-year time periods. An advantage of the longitudinal analysis (ignoring for the
moment econometric problems to be discussed) is that person-specific fixed effects owing to
unmeasured quality fall out, allowing unbiased estimates of Qb and Qw.
III. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE
Our study utilizes several sources of data. The primary wage-level analysis is conducted using
a large sample (n=1,611,829) of black and white workers from the monthly Current Population Survey
Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS ORG) files for the period from January 1983 through December
1992.
5 We match to each individual record in the CPS variables measuring job characteristics. These
variables are either obtained directly from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, calculated by us from
the CPS ORG files, or calculated from special CPS supplements. Wage-change equations are
estimated using three alternative panel or retrospective data sets. Because households are included in
the CPS in the same month for two consecutive years, the CPS ORG files permit construction of large
panels of individuals in adjacent years for the periods 1983/4 through 1991/2 (n=392,877 pairs of
observations). A detailed description of the construction of the CPS ORG panel files is provided in
Appendix 1. We also estimate wage-change equations using the 1983–92 March CPS Annual
Demographic files (n=133,992), which contain information for outgoing rotation groups on wages and
occupation of the current job, as well as for the longest-held job last year. Finally, change equations
are estimated based on the January 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, and 1992 CPS Displaced Worker Surveys
(DWS), which provide current and retrospective job information for workers who have had permanent
layoffs within the past five years (n=10,634). The advantages and disadvantages of these longitudinal
data sets are discussed in Section V. In addition to the data sets used in our regression analysis,
descriptive information on wages, the racial wage gap, and racial composition are provided for the11
1973–92 period using the 1973–78 May CPS files and the 1979–82 CPS ORG files, in addition to the
1983–92 CPS ORG files described above (a total sample of 2,500,253).
Included in the analysis are all black and white wage and salary workers ages sixteen and
over, with complete data provided on usual weekly earnings, usual hours worked per week,
occupation, and other needed variables. Excluded are workers whose principal activity is school
(about 3½ percent of the potential sample) or who had either occupation or industry allocated by the
Census (about 1 percent). Wage rates are measured by usual weekly earnings divided by usual hours
worked per week, in December 1992 dollars, with the monthly CPI-U as the deflator. Excluded from
the sample are workers with measured real wage rates less than $1.00 (about 0.1 percent). Nominal
weekly earnings are top-coded by the Census at $999 for the surveys through 1988 and at $1,923 after
1988. We assign to workers whose weekly earnings are at least $999 in December 1988 dollars
($1,176.42 in December 1992 dollars) the value $1,553.70, representing mean earnings for the post-
1988 sample exceeding the $1,176.42 limit.
Racial composition is measured by B, the proportion of black workers in the worker’s 3-digit
Census occupation, calculated from the CPS ORG files. It is measured by the ratio of black to total
employment by occupation (B is calculated for all wage and salary workers ages sixteen and over,
with no other sample restrictions and with nonwhite nonblacks included in the denominator). In Table
1, measures of B for 1973–92 are provided based on two-year averages for 1973–74, 1975–76, and
1977–78 using the 1973–78 May CPS files (these include all CPS rotation groups but for May only),
and on an annual basis thereafter based on the CPS ORG monthly files for 1979–92 (these include
one-quarter of the total CPS samples but for all months in a year). In subsequent regression analyses
for the 1983–92 period, B is measured by a three-year moving average. This is intended to reduce
measurement error resulting from small sample sizes in some occupation cells, most12
TABLE 1
Black and White Mean Wages, Racial Wage Gaps, Racial Composition,
and Occupational Segregation by Year, 1973–1992
Blacks Whites Wage Adjusted Duncan
Year N Wage B N Wage B Ratio Wage Gap Index
Males:
1973/4 3,480 12.17 .155 38,858 15.62 .087 .779 -.111 .367
1975/6 3,258 11.77 .150 36,568 15.24 .084 .772 -.097 .363
1977/8 3,459 11.71 .143 40,866 15.30 .088 .765 -.118 .336
1979 7,341 11.55 .141 80,167 14.58 .091 .792 -.081 .317
1980 8,288 11.01 .136 91,805 13.93 .090 .790 -.080 .303
1981 7,606 10.98 .137 85,229 13.78 .089 .797 -.079 .311
1982 6,935 10.74 .137 79,176 13.85 .089 .776 -.090 .321
1983 7,023 10.99 .138 78,067 13.92 .091 .790 -.095 .316
1984 7,119 10.89 .140 78,371 13.90 .094 .784 -.089 .315
1985 7,379 10.91 .142 79,278 14.07 .095 .775 -.102 .318
1986 7,497 11.04 .140 77,673 14.28 .096 .773 -.116 .308
1987 7,643 11.03 .144 77,624 14.32 .098 .770 -.117 .305
1988 7,150 11.03 .143 74,491 14.09 .099 .783 -.104 .297
1989 7,200 10.80 .143 75,951 13.94 .100 .775 -.123 .297
1990 7,430 10.68 .142 79,444 13.91 .099 .768 -.130 .293
1991 7,113 10.67 .144 76,451 13.74 .100 .777 -.134 .292
1992 6,834 10.49 .143 74,686 13.64 .099 .769 -.145 .296
Females:
1973/4 3,335 9.10 .213 26,370 10.07 .100 .904 .003 .367
1975/6 3,341 9.04 .202 26,180 9.91 .098 .912 .013 .352
1977/8 3,622 9.26 .187 30,971 9.82 .099 .943 .008 .342
1979 7,597 9.00 .173 61,325 9.43 .101 .954 .010 .302
1980 8,761 8.69 .169 72,855 9.06 .102 .959 .020 .296
1981 8,268 8.56 .165 68,990 9.04 .102 .947 .009 .296
1982 7,829 8.62 .162 65,944 9.19 .101 .938 .004 .299
1983 7,872 8.81 .159 65,786 9.35 .102 .942 -.013 .299
1984 8,115 8.79 .164 65,909 9.43 .106 .932 -.012 .300
1985 8,572 8.96 .162 67,556 9.60 .107 .933 -.002 .293
1986 8,747 9.15 .157 67,928 9.85 .107 .929 -.024 .291
1987 9,004 9.22 .157 68,915 9.96 .109 .926 -.028 .289
1988 8,596 9.12 .160 66,247 9.96 .111 .916 -.035 .280
1989 8,617 9.29 .157 68,032 10.15 .111 .915 -.046 .269
1990 9,163 9.32 .155 71,577 10.28 .110 .907 -.056 .269
1991 8,877 9.50 .154 69,849 10.35 .111 .918 -.045 .274
1992 8,852 9.48 .155 69,191 10.46 .111 .906 -.043 .274
Calculations are from the 1973–78 May CPS and the 1979–92 Annual CPS ORG Files (n=2,500,253). Wages are
measured by usual weekly earnings divided by usual hours worked, in December 1992 dollars. Adjustments for top-
coding are described in the text. B measures the proportion of black to total employment in workers’ detailed occupation.
The wage ratio is the mean of black to white real wages; the adjusted log wage gap is the regression coefficient on a
black dummy from a log wage equation with controls for years of schooling completed, potential experience (measured
by age minus schooling minus 6) and its square, and dummies for married spouse present, ever-married spouse not
present, part-time, public sector, region (8), large metropolitan area, industry (13), and occupation (5). In order to insure
a time-consistent specification, union status and separate federal, state, and local dummies are not included. The Duncan
segregation index is calculated by year by ½S wj-bj , where w and b are the proportions of nonblack and black
employment in occupation j.13
particularly in the wage-change analysis. In addition, lnB rather than B is included in the regression
analysis owing to a nonlinear relationship between lnW and B.
Table 1 presents evidence for the period 1973–92 on black and white wage rates, wage ratios,
the log wage gap from a regression model with standard control variables, the racial composition as
measured by B, and the Duncan index of segregation. The Duncan index, defined as ½S wj-bj ,
where wj and bj are the proportions of nonblack and black employment in occupation j, ranges
between 0 designating complete integration (i.e., the distributions of black and white employment
across occupations are equivalent) and 1 designating complete segregation (occupations are either all
black or all white).
Focusing first on wage rates and the racial gap among males, we see that black and white
wage rates fell over the 1973–92 period, while there was remarkably little change in the black/white
wage ratio. The apparent constancy of the racial wage ratio masks several important changes. In
tabulations not shown, as well as in work by others (e.g., Bound and Freeman, 1992), there is
evidence of a widening racial gap during the 1980s among younger and more-educated cohorts. Our
figures for women indicate substantial real wage growth among both races and smaller racial wage
gaps than among men. But the evidence clearly indicates a widening racial gap among women during
the 1980s and early 1990s (for related evidence, see Card and Lemieux, 1993). In fact, the adjusted
wage gap for women turns from slightly positive in the 1970s and early 1980s to about a 5 percent
wage disadvantage by the 1990s.
Descriptive evidence presented in Table 1 helps identify changes over time in the racial
composition of occupations. Provided are mean values of B for black and white males and females for
the period 1973–92, as well as the Duncan index of segregation, calculated separately by gender. Both
pieces of evidence indicate declining racial segregation, particularly among women. B has increased
over the twenty-year period by about 1 percentage point for white men and women (from roughly 9 to
10 percent for men and from 10 to 11 percent for women). B has decreased most significantly for
black women, from about 21 to 16 percent, while decreasing from 15 to 14 percent for black males.14
Similarly, the Duncan segregation index has declined from .367 to .296 among males, and from .367
to .274 among women.
6 Much of the decline in occupational segregation occurred during the 1970s;
there has been no apparent progress during the 1990s.
Table 2 presents the means of wages, schooling, and selected occupational variables, classified
by B category for each race-sex group for the pooled 1983–92 sample. Workers are segmented into
four occupational categories based on racial composition, with breakpoints for B of .04, .09, and .16
(the pattern of results is invariant to alternative breakpoints). Average wages for black and white
workers decrease substantially as B increases, although this pattern is clearly stronger among men than
among women. Average years of schooling likewise decline with respect to B, indicating that little
can be said about the effect of racial composition on wages, absent detailed control for skill-related
variables. Occupation-level variables that either proxy or measure directly skill level differ
systematically with respect to racial composition. Average job tenure is lowest in occupations with a
large B, the proportion of part-time jobs increases with respect to B, the proportion of workers
receiving formal job training is lowest in high B jobs, computer use falls as B increases, and values of
the DOT skill measures GED and SVP decline sharply with respect to racial composition.
7 DOT
measures of occupational work conditions indicate less pleasant conditions in jobs with relatively high
proportions of black workers, with environmental disamenities, hazards, physical requirements, and
strength being higher in high B than in low B occupations. Everything else equal, differences in job
amenities should lead to equilibrium wages that rise with B. Subsequent regression analyses will
examine directly how much of the relationship between wages and B can be accounted for by various
combinations of occupational characteristics.15
TABLE 2
Means of Selected Individual and Occupational Variables by Race and Racial Composition Category, 1983–1992
Black Means White Means
Value of B Value of B
0–.04 .04–.09 .09–.16 .16+ All 0–.04 .04–09 .09–16 .16+ All
Males:
Wage (12/92 $) 15.971 13.286 10.429 9.095 10.855 18.546 15.619 11.714 9.794 13.981
Schooling 14.526 13.078 11.854 11.426 12.095 14.721 13.546 12.275 11.565 13.027
DOT-GED 4.240 3.559 2.380 1.945 2.583 4.265 3.696 2.498 1.937 3.158
DOT-SVP 4.170 3.090 0.998 0.523 1.456 4.120 3.373 1.217 0.552 2.422
OCC-Training 0.512 0.460 0.296 0.227 0.320 0.522 0.470 0.323 0.226 0.398
OCC-Computer 0.479 0.348 0.201 0.095 0.210 0.483 0.380 0.222 0.098 0.305
OCC-Job Tenure 7.300 7.793 6.624 6.054 6.742 7.437 7.864 6.901 6.147 7.283
OCC-Part-time 0.088 0.088 0.164 0.221 0.162 0.079 0.078 0.151 0.207 0.118
DOT-Environment 0.105 0.342 0.407 0.595 0.446 0.129 0.301 0.405 0.618 0.357
DOT-Hazards 0.074 0.190 0.193 0.216 0.196 0.084 0.173 0.202 0.220 0.178
DOT-Physical 1.239 1.777 1.956 1.925 1.878 1.204 1.648 1.928 1.891 1.712
DOT-Strength 1.814 2.248 2.559 2.743 2.521 1.836 2.155 2.515 2.733 2.306
N 2,203 18,184 27,030 24,971 72,388 91,632 342,341 227,120 110,943 772,036
Females:
Wage (12/92 $) 13.340 11.145 9.546 7.541 9.171 13.066 10.742 9.481 7.874 9.946
Schooling 14.620 13.594 12.963 11.502 12.543 14.310 13.472 13.037 11.784 13.071
DOT-GED 4.246 3.770 2.928 2.298 2.896 4.022 3.716 3.017 2.382 3.272
DOT-SVP 3.997 2.548 1.309 0.578 1.352 3.467 2.457 1.384 0.660 1.849
OCC-Training 0.533 0.450 0.394 0.276 0.361 0.505 0.434 0.406 0.294 0.403
OCC-Computer 0.510 0.523 0.388 0.150 0.326 0.466 0.502 0.397 0.185 0.410
OCC-Job Tenure 6.425 6.413 6.390 5.638 6.088 6.169 6.217 6.351 5.526 6.129
OCC-Part-time 0.129 0.201 0.247 0.298 0.255 0.164 0.219 0.253 0.286 0.239
DOT-Environment 0.041 0.068 0.133 0.396 0.223 0.039 0.058 0.120 0.400 0.139
DOT-Hazards 0.027 0.025 0.044 0.156 0.085 0.022 0.020 0.039 0.152 0.050
DOT-Physical 1.053 1.404 1.402 1.954 1.624 1.110 1.390 1.362 1.915 1.463
DOT-Strength 1.698 1.617 1.893 2.454 2.052 1.756 1.617 1.884 2.367 1.844
N 1,153 21,413 28,436 35,413 86,415 34,610 311,882 209,574 124,924 680,990
All means are calculated across individuals in the 1983–92 CPS ORG. Wage is usual weekly earnings divided by usual
weekly hours, in December 1992 dollars, with treatment for top-coding discussed in the text. Schooling measures years
completed. Variables preceded by "OCC" and "DOT" are means of variables in workers’ designated occupations; all
except OCC-Computer are fixed over the 1983–92 period. OCC-Training is the proportion of workers receiving formal
or informal training on the current job, calculated from the January 1983 and 1991 CPS supplements. OCC-Computer
is the proportion using computers at their job, calculated from the October 1984 and 1989 CPS supplements and trended
linearly back to 1983 and forward to 1992. OCC-Tenure is years with current employer, calculated from the May 1983
and 1988 CPS Pension Supplements and the January 1983, 1987, and 1991 CPS. OCC-Part-time is the proportion of
workers in the occupation who usually work fewer than thirty-five hours a week, calculated from the CPS ORG files.
DOT measures are taken from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and matched to workers based on 1980 Census of
Population occupation codes: DOT-GED is a 1–6 index of general educational development, DOT-SVP is years
required for occupational proficiency or specific vocational preparation, DOT-Environment is the number of work
environment disamenities from 0–5, DOT-Hazards is the proportion in hazardous jobs, DOT-Physical is the number of
physical demands from 0–4, and DOT-Strength is measured by a 1–5 index from low to high strength required.16
IV. WAGES AND RACIAL COMPOSITION: CROSS-SECTIONAL EVIDENCE
Table 3 presents the racial composition coefficients from alternative specifications of log wage
equations, estimated in levels for black males, white males, black females, and white females, using
the pooled CPS ORG files for 1983–92. We provide coefficients from two specifications, a "standard"
model including a typical set of individual and labor market characteristics, and an "expanded" model
including a detailed set of job characteristics, most of which measure the skill composition or working
conditions of the occupation.
Included in the standard specification are variables measured at the individual level: years of
schooling completed and potential experience and its square; and dummies for union coverage,
part-time, marital status (2), public sector (3), region (8), large metropolitan area, industry (13),
occupation (5), and year (9). The expanded specification adds variables measuring means at the
occupation and industry levels. Occupation variables included are DOT-GED, a 1–6 index of general
educational development measuring necessary reasoning, writing, and mathematical skills; DOT-SVP,
representing specific vocational preparation and measured by years required for proficiency in an
occupation; OCC-Training, the proportion of workers receiving formal or informal training on the
current job; OCC-Computer, the proportion of workers using a computer on the job; OCC-Job Tenure,
years with current employer; OCC-Part-time, the proportion of workers in the occupation who usually
work fewer than thirty-five hours a week; DOT-Environment, the number of work environment
disamenities from 0–5; DOT-Hazards, the proportion in hazardous jobs; DOT-Physical, the number of
physical demands from 0–4; and DOT-Strength, a 1–5 index from low to high strength required.
Industry-level variables included are IND-Union, measuring the proportion covered by a union in the
worker’s industry; and IND-Big Firm, measuring the proportion of workers in firms with at least 1000
employees. The notes to Tables 2 and 3 provide the sources from which these variables are
calculated.17
TABLE 3
Racial Composition Coefficients with Log, Linear, and Quadratic Composition Measures,
Pooled Data Set, 1983–1992
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1’
Group and Specification lnBB B B
2 lnB*
Black Males:
Standard -0.0958 -0.6861 -1.5758 2.5529 -0.0990
(0.0038) (0.0299) (0.0844) (0.2267) (0.0036)
Expanded -0.0293 -0.1519 -0.6154 1.2944 -0.0349
(0.0042) (0.0326) (0.0903) (0.2353) (0.0041)
White Males:
Standard -0.0841 -1.0562 -2.2735 4.5426 -0.0850
(0.0009) (0.0113) (0.0301) (0.1041) (0.0009)
Expanded -0.0478 -0.5303 -1.6223 3.8951 -0.0480
(0.0010) (0.0127) (0.0325) (0.1066) (0.0010)
Black Females:
Standard -0.0476 -0.1823 -1.3907 3.0729 -0.0727
(0.0030) (0.0213) (0.0645) (0.1548) (0.0030)
Expanded -0.0176 0.0011 -0.8546 2.1467 -0.0378
(0.0035) (0.0244) (0.0730) (0.1725) (0.0035)
White Females:
Standard -0.0461 -0.2096 -1.6573 4.5338 -0.0768
(0.0010) (0.0090) (0.0257) (0.0752) (0.0009)
Expanded -0.0305 -0.0637 -1.3859 3.9956 -0.0528
(0.0011) (0.0103) (0.0282) (0.0793) (0.0011)
*Excludes workers whose wages are less than 1.1 times the minimum wage.
Sample sizes for Models 1–3 are as follows: black males, 72,388; white males, 772,036; black females, 86,415; and
white females, 680,990. Sample sizes for Model 1’ are 65,331; 732,693; 73,887; and 606,702, respectively. The
"standard" specifications include variables measured at the individual level: years of schooling completed and potential
experience and its square; and dummies for union coverage, part-time, marital status (2), public sector (3), region (8),
large metropolitan area, industry (13), occupation (5), and year (9). The "expanded" specifications add variables
measuring means at the occupation and industry levels. Occupation variables included are those defined in Table 2:
DOT-GED, DOT-SVP, OCC-Training, OCC-Computer, OCC-Job Tenure, OCC-Part-time, DOT-Environment,
DOT-Hazards, DOT-Physical, and DOT-Strength. Additional occupational- and industry-level variables are OCC-Female,
measuring the proportion female and calculated from the CPS ORG files; IND-Union, measuring the proportion covered
by a union in the worker’s industry and calculated from the CPS ORG files; and IND-Big Firm, measuring the proportion
in the worker’s industry in firms with ³1000 employees, calculated from the May 1983 CPS Pension Supplement and the
March 1989–92 CPS files. Standard errors are in parentheses.18
Column one presents coefficients from equations including our preferred variable, lnB,a st h e
measure of racial composition. For comparison, we present results from alternative equations, one
including B and another B and B
2. As evident from the quadratic specification, the relationship is
clearly nonlinear, with lnW decreasing with respect to B at a decreasing rate. Coefficients on B from
the linear specification turn out to be misleading, differences across groups resulting more from being
measured at different levels of B than from true differences in the wage-composition relationship. For
example, the linear specification tends to exaggerate differences in the racial composition effect for
white relative to black males, owing to the fact that white workers are observed at relatively low levels
of B. We prefer the simple lnB specification because this facilitates a compact presentation of results,
allows easy comparison across groups of workers and for models with alternative explanatory
variables, and provides a statistical fit superior to the linear and highly similar to specifications with a
quadratic term or (in work not shown) with a set of racial density dummies.
8
Results from the "standard" model, presented in Table 3, indicate significantly lower wages for
black and white males and, to a lesser extent, black and white females, in occupations with high
concentrations of black workers. These results are consistent with the far more limited evidence
presented previously in Hirsch and Schumacher (1992). Point estimates close to -.10 for males
indicate that each 10 percent increase in B is associated with wage rates 1 percent lower; point
estimates are half as large for women.
9
We next investigate the quality sorting hypothesis in an "expanded" model that introduces
explicit measures of occupational skill and other job characteristics (in a later section we estimate
wage-change models controlling for unmeasured person-specific skills). Appendix 2 includes complete
regression results for the expanded model. Coefficients on most variables are consistent with
expectations, although signs on job characteristics cannot be predicted unambiguously given worker
heterogeneity (Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard, 1992). We forgo discussion of these results in order to19
save space. Inclusion of occupational characteristics again sharply reduces the effect of racial
composition for all four demographic groups, reducing coefficients in general by more than half. For
males, the elasticity of wages with respect to B is about -.03 to -.05, while for women the elasticities
are even smaller (-.02 to -.03). The sharp reduction in the coefficient on lnB resulting from adding
skill-related individual and occupational variables provides strong support for the thesis that B serves
primarily as an occupational skill index. Even in the expanded model, however, racial composition
remains a significant and nontrivial determinant of earnings for both white and black workers.
We next consider the possibility that the pattern of results found to this point is due in part
from the presence of a minimum wage floor. Our evidence indicates a nonlinear relationship between
the log wage and B (hence the use of lnB or a quadratic specification), as well as smaller racial
composition effects in the South, among women, and for less-educated workers. A possible
explanation for these results is that these workers are most likely to be affected by a binding minimum
wage floor. Among low-wage workers and at high levels of B, further increases in B can have
relatively little negative effect since wages are already close to their minimum.
10
In order to explore this issue, we estimate racial density coefficients with a sample excluding
workers below, at, or near the minimum wage. We exclude all workers with wage rates below 1.1
times the minimum wage, in December 1992 dollars.
11 These results are shown in the far right
column of Table 3 (Model 1’). Omitting low-wage workers has the predicted result. Coefficient
estimates for males are little affected, since relatively few are below the wage threshold. By contrast,
coefficients for both black and white women increase in absolute value following the exclusion of low-
wage workers. In fact, differences in coefficients on lnB between women and men are rather minor
following this exclusion. Although the minimum wage has an effect on estimates of Q among women,
it is not sufficient to explain the nonlinearity of the lnW-B relationship for either women or men. Use
of either lnB or a quadratic in B remains strongly preferred to the linear specification; the nonlinear20
relationship occurs in the data at wages well above the minimum wage threshold. An implication of
our results is that minimum wage laws (at historical levels) have done little to reduce the negative
relationship between racial density and the wages for white and black men, but have mitigated these
effects among women.
Table 4 provides estimates of Q from alternative specifications of lnW equations. We present
in turn models with only lnB and no controls (line 1); a base model with all individual characteristics
but no industry or occupation dummies (2); the base model plus thirteen industry dummies (3); the
base model plus five occupation dummies (4); the standard model seen previously, consisting of the
base model plus industry and occupation dummies (line 5); the standard model plus the separate
addition of occupation-level skill measures DOT-GED (6), DOT-SVP (7), OCC-Training (8),
OCC-Computer (9), OCC-Job Tenure (10), and OCC-Part-time (11); the standard model plus the joint
addition of these six skill-related variables (12); the standard model plus the DOT work condition
variables (13); and the expanded model seen previously, containing all individual, occupation, and
industry variables (14).
If lnB serves as an index for otherwise unmeasured job skills, as implied by the quality sorting
hypothesis, its coefficient should move toward zero as one introduces variables that measure directly
or are correlated with worker skills. The evidence in Table 4 supports quite clearly this interpretation.
The magnitude of Q is reduced most sharply in response to the inclusion of individual characteristics
(line 2), broad occupation dummies (4), DOT-GED (6), and OCC-Computer (9). Comparing lines (13)
and (5), DOT working conditions have little effect on estimates of Q for males, but increase the
magnitude of the estimate for women. That is, women in occupations with relatively high densities of
black workers tend to have working conditions associated with significantly higher21
TABLE 4
Racial Composition Coefficients from Alternative Specifications
Black White Black White
Specification Males Males Females Females
1. No Controls -0.2732 -0.2844 -0.2820 -0.1892
(0.0034) (0.0009) (0.0028) (0.0010)
2. Base (individual -0.1825 -0.1556 -0.1447 -0.0979
characteristics only) (0.0030) (0.0008) (0.0026) (0.0009)
3. Base + 13 industry -0.1911 -0.1560 -0.1508 -0.1216
dummies (0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0026) (0.0009)
4. Base + 5 occupation -0.0871 -0.0909 -0.0335 -0.0153
dummies (0.0037) (0.0009) (0.0030) (0.0010)
5. Standard model (Base + -0.0958 -0.0841 -0.0476 -0.0461
5 occ., 13 ind., dummies) (0.0038) (0.0009) (0.0030) (0.0010)
6. Standard + GED -0.0511 -0.0491 -0.0097 -0.0164
(0.0040) (0.0010) (0.0032) (0.0010)
7. Standard + SVP -0.0895 -0.0806 -0.0579 -0.0508
(0.0037) (0.0009) (0.0030) (0.0010)
8. Standard + Training -0.0815 -0.0729 -0.0446 -0.0414
(0.0038) (0.0009) (0.0030) (0.0010)
9. Standard + Computer -0.0367 -0.0422 -0.0058 0.0003
(0.0041) (0.0010) (0.0033) (0.0010)
10. Standard + Job Tenure -0.0665 -0.0667 -0.0473 -0.0438
(0.0038) (0.0009) (0.0030) (0.0010)
11. Standard + Part-time -0.0733 -0.0780 -0.0242 -0.0351
(0.0038) (0.0009) (0.0031) (0.0010)
12. Standard+SVP, GED, Training, -0.0347 -0.0499 -0.0196 -0.0155
Computer, Job Tenure, Part-time (0.0041) (0.0010) (0.0034) (0.0011)
13. Standard + DOT measures -0.0855 -0.0795 -0.0555 -0.0641
other than SVP, GED (0.0038) (0.0009) (0.0031) (0.0010)
14. Expanded (Standard + all -0.0293 -0.0478 -0.0176 -0.0305
job characteristics) (0.0042) (0.0010) (0.0035) (0.0011)
N 72,388 772,036 86,415 680,990
Data set is the CPS ORG files for 1983–92. Shown are coefficients and standard errors on the racial composition
variable lnB. See Tables 2 and 3 for definitions of individual, occupation, and industry variables. The base model
includes years of schooling completed; potential experience and its square; and dummies for union coverage, part-time,
marital status (2), public sector (3), region (8), and year (9). Standard errors are in parentheses.22
pay. The negative wage-composition relationship exists in spite of these differences. Although the
magnitudes of estimated racial composition effects have been reduced sharply by the inclusion of skill-
related individual and job characteristics, lnB remains a significant determinant of wage rates for all
workers, regardless of gender or race (line 14).
Table 5 presents estimates of the racial composition relationship for the four demographic
groups based on classification by age, schooling, region, private-public sector, union status, part-time
and full-time, production worker status, and Hispanic status. Although there is variability in the
pattern of coefficients across the demographic groups, the effects of racial composition generally are
largest among prime-age workers, those with higher education, in the non-South, in the private sector,
in nonunion jobs, among full-time workers, and in nonproduction jobs. The results with respect to
schooling are consistent with the quality sorting explanation, since the black-white ability gap widens
as schooling levels increase (O’Neill, 1990). In fact, the broad tendency is for racial density effects to
be larger in broad sectors with a substantial number of information-based occupations and substantial
heterogeneity in skill levels across occupations. The fact that the marginal effects of racial
composition are generally smaller where blacks are overrepresented (e.g., less educated, South, young,
union, and production workers) argues against crowding explanations of the racial composition effect.
In results not presented, we examine changes over time in Q, the coefficient on lnB.
Coefficients for males are relatively stable over time, apart from evidence of a moderate increase in
the magnitude of Q beginning in 1989. For women, however, we find clear-cut evidence of an
increase in the effect of lnB through time, with weak effects of lnB during the early and mid-1980s,
followed by increases during the late 1980s for black women and in 1989 for white women. Note that
the unexplained racial wage gap among women increased sharply during this same time period (Table
1). Although not further explored here, the clear suggestion is that demand shifts in the23
TABLE 5
Racial Composition Coefficients among Alternative Worker Groups,
Wage-Level Equations, Pooled for 1983–1992
Black Males White Males Black Females White Females
Group Standard Expanded Standard Expanded Standard Expanded Standard Expanded
All Workers -.0958 -.0293 -.0841 -.0478 -.0476 -.0176 -.0461 -.0305
Ages 16–29 -.0846 -.0301 -.0614 -.0202 -.0458 -.0298 -.0333 -.0271
Ages 30–44 -.1079 -.0277 -.0883 -.0489 -.0653 -.0254 -.0630 -.0394
Ages 45–99 -.0686 -.0158 .0926 -.0632 -.0096 -.0002 -.0251 -.0160
Educ: 0–11 -.0270 .0168 -.0575 -.0221 .0363 .0294 .0500 .0286
Educ: 12 -.0713 -.0118 -.0713 -.0320 -.0343 -.0121 -.0321 -.0248
Educ: 13–15 -.1072 -.0437 -.0817 -.0450 -.0623 -.0350 -.0542 -.0598
Educ: 16 -.1564 -.0872 -.1019 -.0706 -.1443 -.0823 -.1189 -.0701
Educ: >16 -.0968 -.0725 -.0670 -.0673 -.1057 -.0471 -.0663 -.0237
Non-South -.1091 -.0534 -.0842 -.0482 -.0468 -.0281 -.0440 -.0318
South -.0796 -.0041 -.0837 -.0473 -.0428 -.0087 -.0509 -.0269
Private -.0844 -.0356 -.0825 -.0604 -.0448 -.0225 -.0476 -.0402
Public -.0954 -.0098 -.0637 -.0110 -.0606 -.0234 -.0545 -.0068
Nonunion -.0946 -.0319 -.0789 -.0517 -.0459 -.0152 -.0478 -.0350
Union -.0718 -.0135 -.0674 -.0224 -.0473 -.0242 -.0335 -.0083
Full-time -.1029 -.0363 -.0811 -.0484 -.0655 -.0334 -.0590 -.0360
Part-time -.0002 .0051 -.1026 -.0660 .0244 -.0080 -.0153 -.0361
Nonproduction -.1142 -.0525 -.0914 -.0594 -.0450 -.0263 -.0443 -.0336
Production -.0598 .0031 -.0546 -.0209 -.0393 .0723 -.0668 .0204
Non-Hispanic -.0961 -.0294 -.0830 -.0488 -.0474 -.0172 -.0468 -.0322
Hispanic -.0718 -.0246 -.0860 -.0330 -.0622 -.0525 -.0478 -.0272
Standard and expanded specifications are described in note to Table 3. Shown are coefficients on the racial composition
variable lnB. All models include year dummies. Sample sizes and standard errors are not shown.24
economy since the late 1980s that favored information-based jobs and increased the returns to skill
help explain the pattern of racial composition effects over time.
12 This interpretation further supports
the view that B serves largely as an index of occupational skill.
A final probe of our wage-level results concerns potential problems associated with matching
aggregate data on occupations to individual worker data. Matching grouped to individual data biases
downward standard errors, but need not bias coefficient estimates. To provide a check on our results,
we use a two-step estimation strategy suggested by Dickens and Ross (1984) utilizing all the
information in the sample but without biased standard errors. In the first-step wage equation, only
variables measured at the individual level or that vary within detailed occupations are included. The
mean of the equation’s error term for each detailed occupation is then calculated (this is equivalent to
including detailed occupation dummies). The wage differences by occupation calculated in the first
step form the dependent variable in a second-step regression. These are estimated by WLS, with
occupation sample sizes as weights (this corresponds to the implicit weighting in our previous single
equation results), as well as by OLS, which gives equal weights to occupation rather than individuals.
Included in the second-step equations are lnB and broad occupation dummies for the standard model;
the expanded model includes all occupational variables that vary across but not within detailed
occupations. Table 6 presents these results. As expected, the WLS point estimates are close to what
we obtained previously using single-step estimation, with a tendency to be slightly larger in
magnitude. Standard errors are no longer biased downward, however, being substantially larger than
those shown previously. Estimated OLS coefficients, based on equal weights to occupation cells, are
close to zero and generally insignificant.25
TABLE 6
Second-Step Aggregate OLS and WLS Estimates of Racial
Composition Coefficients, with Correction for Standard Errors
Black White
OLS WLS OLS WLS
Males:
Standard -.0195 -.0900 -.0245 -.0849
(.0141) (.0096) (.0057) (.0086)
Expanded .0294 -.0377 -.0053 -.0570
(.0146) (.0091) (.0057) (.0090)
N 479 495
Females:
Standard -.0359 -.0356 -.0044 -.0533
(.0182) (.0103) (.0074) (.0100)
Expanded .0206 -.0107 .0124 -.0406
(.0188) (.0101) (.0075) (.0107)
N 438 491
Standard and expanded specifications are described in note to Table 3. All models include year dummies. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Units of observation are 3-digit Census occupations. N equals the number of non-empty
occupation cells following sample restrictions, out of a possible 497 CPS occupations (made time-consistent between the
1983–91 files using 1980 Census of Population codes and the 1992 file using 1990 codes). The dependent variable in the
two-step model is the mean of the error term, by occupation, from a first-step log wage regression including all variables
that vary within occupations. The second-step regression includes lnB and all other variables that vary across but not
within occupations. Weighted least squares (WLS) estimates use occupation sample sizes as weights.26
V. WAGES, RACIAL COMPOSITION, AND QUALITY SORTING: LONGITUDINAL
EVIDENCE
In order to test directly the hypothesis that unmeasured worker skill differences correlated with
the racial composition of occupations account for much of the observed negative relationship between
B and wages, longitudinal wage-change equations are estimated. As explained previously, variant
three of the quality sorting hypothesis implies that wage changes among occupational switchers should
not be systematically correlated with changes in racial composition. We estimate wage-change
equations using three alternative panel or retrospective data sets, each with advantages and
disadvantages.
Econometric problems with longitudinal analysis are potentially serious and warrant discussion
up front. Many wage-change studies are plagued by relatively small overall sample sizes, and in
particular small numbers of true switchers for the variable under consideration (e.g., union status). By
contrast, the CPS panels developed here provide very large sample sizes with many occupational
switchers. Because our matched pairs are for adjacent years, we must assume that wage changes
associated with the change in racial composition are realized quickly. This implies that the fixed
quality effects that we net out in the longitudinal analysis, while unmeasured by the researcher, are
known to the employer and quickly reflected in the wage following a job switch. More problematic is
the maintained assumption that changes in racial composition are exogenous. We know that job
switching is potentially endogenous—voluntary switchers are more likely to switch because of wage
increases, involuntary switchers are more likely to face wage loss, and switchers are likely to differ
from stayers. Endogenous job switching need not bias estimates of Q, however, if occupational
switching is uncorrelated with changes in racial composition. The problem of endogenous switching is
addressed through the use of the Displaced Worker Surveys (DWS), where occupational changes are
largely involuntary and far more likely to be exogenous.
A more serious problem in the longitudinal analysis is possible coefficient bias toward zero
resulting from measurement error in DlnB. Bias is most serious in longitudinal models where27
intertemporal variance owing to measurement error is large relative to true variance of a
right-hand-side variable (for an application, see Freeman, 1984). Such bias is potentially important in
the CPS ORG matched panels since a substantial number of persons have occupation misclassified in
the CPS (Mellow and Sider, 1983) and the time period of the panels is short (i.e., one year), leading to
a relatively high noise to signal ratio. Bias associated with mismeasured occupational change is
addressed in several ways, including the use of alternative data sets (the March CPS and DWS files)
containing retrospective occupation information providing more accurate occupational change measures
than do the CPS ORG panels.
Although we expect bias from measurement error in the longitudinal analysis, several points
are in order. Our sample excludes all worker-year pairs where occupation (or industry) has been
allocated by the Census in either the first or second year. Second, there exists serial correlation in
response error (for evidence on earnings, see Bound and Krueger, 1991) so that a stayer who reports
the incorrect occupational category in year 1 may report the same category in year 2. In this case,
"two wrongs make a right" since the person would be classified correctly as having DlnB=0. Most
important, among those workers misclassified by occupation, it is likely that they report a closely
related occupation whose B is similar to B in their actual occupation.
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The primary way in which we reduce measurement error bias in the CPS ORG panels is by
separating occupational switchers who do and do not report a change in industry. The CPS ORG
longitudinal results in Table 7 provide coefficient estimates on DlnB for workers who switch both
occupation and industry; separate coefficients are estimated for those who change occupation but not
industry (these are not shown). The reason for this procedure is that workers who report changes both
in industry and occupation are far more likely to be true occupational changers than those28
TABLE 7
Panel Data Estimates of lnB and DlnB Coefficients for Wage-Level and Wage-Change
Models Using the CPS ORG, March CPS, and CPS Displaced Worker Surveys
Black Males White Males Black Females White Females
Levels Change Levels Change Levels Change Levels Change
CPS ORG Panel:
Standard -.1011 -.0078 -.0867 -.0326 -.0582 .0020 -.0519 .0040
(.0078) (.0128) (.0018) (.0029) (.0066) (.0114) (.0020) (.0032)
Expanded -.0317 .0089 -.0535 -.0250 -.0248 .0131 -.0314 .0037
(.0086) (.0137) (.0020) (.0031) (.0075) (.0123) (.0023) (.0034)
N 16,229 190,274 20,445 165,929
March CPS Panel:
Standard -.0872 -.0254 -.0758 -.0281 -.0451 -.0145 -.0454 .0122
(.0142) (.0306) (.0033) (.0063) (.0111) (.0263) (.0035) (.0078)
Expanded -.0150 .0296 -.0452 -.0182 -.0311 -.0433 -.0314 .0038
(.0160) (.0342) (.0037) (.0066) (.0130) (.0305) (.0041) (.0089)
N 5,498 59,747 6,628 62,119
DWS—Plant Closings and Layoffs Sample:
Standard -.1059 -.0132 -.1077 -.0243 -.0393 .0005 -.0769 -.0076
(.0358) (.0328) (.0109) (.0095) (.0408) (.0403) (.0149) (.0136)
Expanded -.0698 -.0039 -.0756 -.0202 -.0393 -.0167 -.0540 -.0153
(.0358) (.0332) (.0124) (.0108) (.0414) (.0407) (.0171) (.0161)
N 477 6,389 401 3,367
Standard and expanded specifications for the CPS ORG samples are described in the note to Table 3. All models include
year dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. Change equations have DlnW as the dependent variable; the
coefficients on DlnB are presented. Change equations from the March CPS files differ in specification from those in the
CPS ORG because they include changes in region and public-sector status, but exclude changes in marital status, union
status, and in federal, state, and local worker status. The DWS results are based on the January 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990,
and 1992 CPS supplemental Displaced Worker Surveys. The sample consists of workers who were age twenty and older
and who were displaced from a full-time, private-sector job because of a plant closing, slack work, or a position or shift
that was eliminated. The sample was futher restricted to workers who were reemployed at the survey date in a full-time
wage and salary job, and excludes those displaced from the construction industry. The dependent variable in the change
equation is the difference between the log of current weekly earnings and the log of predisplacement weekly earnings. In
addition to the usual change variables, panel estimates include dummies for year of displacement and survey year.29
workers reporting a different occupation but the same industry. Thus, estimates of Q are less affected
by measurement error for industry movers than for industry stayers. In a preliminary analysis not
shown, we confirmed that coefficients for occupation-only switchers are closer to zero than are
coefficients for occupation and industry switchers. And in a separate analysis matching workers in the
January 1986 and January 1987 CPS surveys (the latter contains a measure of years in current
occupation that we treat as a "true" measure of switching), we confirmed that those recorded as both
occupation and industry changers are far more likely to be "true" switchers than those recorded as
changing only occupations, and that most "true" occupational switchers also switch industries.
Although our primary analysis is based on the very large CPS ORG panels, we supplement
this analysis with evidence from the March CPS files for 1983–92 and the five CPS DWS surveys.
Both of these data sets provide measures of DlnB less affected by error from mismeasured
occupational change. The DWS has the added advantage of measuring occupational change over a
longer time period and recording primarily involuntary and exogenous changes.
The March CPS files record not only responses on current earnings, occupation, and other
characteristics, but also on a respondent’s occupation, industry, and class (private, public, self-
employed) in the longest job held during the previous year; annual earnings, weeks worked, and hours
worked per week the previous year; and state of residence the previous March. Occupation change is
far less likely to be measured with error in the March files than in the CPS ORG panels. The CPS
ORG panels rely on information from two interviews, one year apart, typically conducted by different
individuals and possibly with different household members, and coded by different Census coders.
The March files, by contrast, rely on information from a single interview with a single household
member by a single interviewer and with a single occupation coder (except in the event of an
occupation change).
14 An added advantage of the March files is that they include information on
workers who have changed households or locations or who could not be matched from the ORG files30
from separate years. The disadvantages of the March files are that sample sizes are smaller; the wage
rate in the previous year is calculated from earnings, weeks, and hours information that can be
determined in part by jobs other than the longest held (random measurement error from this source
should not bias coefficients since it is on the left-side of the wage-change equations); and information
is not available that would allow construction of variables measuring changes in union and marital
status.
A third panel data set is constructed using the January 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, and 1992 CPS
Displaced Workers Surveys (DWS). The DWS provide information on whether workers have lost or
left a job during the past five years because of a plant closing, an employer going out of business, a
layoff from which a worker was not recalled, or some other similar reason. As with the March
surveys, it is relatively unlikely that there will be a false identification of switchers in the DWS. In
addition, job and occupational change among displaced workers is more likely to be exogenous. The
analysis could be limited further to only those affected by plant closings, since some layoffs may not
be completely exogenous (for a similar argument and use of the DWS, see Gibbons and Katz, 1992);
however, we do not do this owing to the small sample sizes of black workers affected by plant
closings. Although overall sample sizes in the DWS are far smaller than in the other two data sets,
the sample includes only job changers; hence the number of occupational switchers is of a magnitude
similar to that in the March CPS files.
Table 7 presents estimates of Q from the standard and expanded specifications of both
wage-level and wage-change models based, alternatively, on the CPS ORG panels for 1983/4–1991/2,
the March CPS files for 1983–92, and the five January CPS DWS files for 1984 through 1992. Wage-
level estimates are based on the second year for each worker-year pair—1984–92 for the CPS ORG
files, 1983–92 for the March CPS, and the five survey years for the DWS. Despite differences in
samples and specification, the results from all three data sets support the quality sorting hypothesis. In31
virtually all cases, controlling for unmeasured person-specific effects through the estimation of change
equations leads to coefficients of the racial composition variable much closer to zero. The change in
estimates of Q between the levels and change equations is particularly large for black males and white
females, indicating that for these groups B serves as a particularly strong index of unmeasured skill.
And among the large group of white males, estimates of Q fall by more than half as one moves from
the wage-level to the wage-change specifications. Similar evidence is found for black women in most
cases, the exception being the expanded change model from the March CPS. The similarity of
estimates of Q between the standard and expanded wage-change models provides particularly strong
support to variant three of our quality sorting model. Once one accounts for unmeasured person-
specific skills, estimates of Q are close to zero, regardless of whether occupational skill measures are
explicitly measured. These results support the hypothesis that B serves primarily as a proxy for
unmeasured worker skills, rather than the productivity of jobs independent of workers.
The similarity in estimates between the CPS ORG panels, where mismeasurement of
occupational changes is a serious concern, and the retrospective March CPS files, where changes are
measured far more accurately, provides reassurance that measurement error in the DlnB variable does
not seriously bias our estimates. The DWS results for black and white males are highly similar to
those from the CPS ORG and March CPS panels, indicating that endogenous occupational change in
the latter two data sets has not biased substantially our estimates. DWS results for women differ
somewhat from those in the other two data sets, but standard errors are large. Indeed, Q is not
statistically significant for any demographic group in the DWS expanded change model.
The clear conclusion from the results presented in Table 7 is that the strong negative
relationship between the wages of white and black workers and the proportion of black workers in an
occupation can be accounted for entirely or almost entirely by measured and unmeasured worker and
job skills. After controlling for job skills and estimation of wage-change models, little evidence of an32
effect of racial composition on wages remains. Absent controls for occupational skill measures and
person-specific fixed effects, B is a negative and significant correlate of earnings. On that basis, its
inclusion in wage-equation estimates can be justified. It is important, however, that B not be regarded
as a causal determinant of wages but, rather, as a proxy for otherwise unmeasured worker and job
skills.
Our findings also imply that estimates of wage discrimination should include controls for the
skill composition of occupations or, absent such measures, a control for racial composition. Wage
differentials attributable to differences in B, however, must not be included in the unexplained or
discriminatory component of the standard wage differential decomposition. In results not shown, we
find that B accounts for about 27 percent of the explained portion, and 15 percent of the total, racial
wage gap among men; corresponding numbers among women are 40 and 23 percent. Addition of B to
a standard specification (i.e., including occupation dummies), however, reduces unexplained wage
differentials (i.e., measures of discrimination) by relatively modest amounts.
15 These unexplained
wage differentials (our best measures of current labor market discrimination) reflect within-occupation
wage differences as well as inter-occupational differences uncorrelated with racial composition and
occupational skill measures. Our analysis provides no direct evidence on the extent to which
intra-occupational wage differences not accounted for by measured characteristics are the result of
unmeasured differences in worker skills correlated with individual race (as opposed to occupation
racial density).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Our study has examined the relationship between wage rates and the racial composition of
jobs. We confirm that wages of black and white workers are significantly lower in occupations with33
high proportions of black workers, and higher in predominantly white occupations, after accounting for
standard measured characteristics. We tested the thesis that quality sorting by race, whereby B is
negatively correlated with measured and unmeasured labor quality, is an important explanation for the
observed relationship between wages and racial composition. We argue that labor market
discrimination is likely to lead to a sorting equilibrium in which higher-skilled black and white
workers are sorted into higher-productivity jobs with low levels of B, and lower-skilled blacks and
whites are sorted into jobs with relatively lower productivity and higher B.
We tested the quality sorting hypothesis by introducing into wage equations characteristics
measuring occupational skill levels (e.g., required years of training, job tenure, computer usage), and
by estimating wage-change equations that account for otherwise unmeasured individual-specific
differences in productivity fixed over time. Wage-level equations were estimated using the January
1983 through December 1992 Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS ORG) files.
The longitudinal analysis used three data sets: a large panel constructed from the CPS ORG including
worker-year pairs for 1983/4 through 1991/2; the March CPS files for 1983–92 containing current and
retrospective information on wages and occupation; and the CPS Displaced Worker Surveys (DWS)
between 1984 and 1992 containing retrospective information on displaced workers.
The findings in the study are rather clear-cut and provide strong support for the quality sorting
hypothesis. Using wage-level analysis, coefficients on lnB are reduced sharply when characteristics
measuring occupational skills are introduced into the wage equation. Wage-change equations
accounting for person-specific skill differences, with or without controls for occupational
characteristics, indicate little if any relationship between racial composition and wages. Workers
switching into or out of occupations with different racial densities do not realize wage changes
associated with the change in racial composition.34
This study provides extensive evidence on what largely has been ignored in the literature on
racial wage differences—wages for both white and black workers vary systematically with the racial
composition of jobs.
16 An implication of our study is that B provides an important control for what
are typically unmeasured worker quality and occupational skill differences. It is important, however,
that racial composition be interpreted as such, rather than as a causal determinant of wages. These
results are not without policy implications. If differences in worker skills are a driving force behind
current racial employment and wage differentials, our results provide support for strong efforts at
enhancing training for African-Americans, both in and out of school.
17 Such a policy emphasis has
particular urgency given recent demand shifts in the economy that have favored skill-intensive and
information-based occupations and produced a rising return to skills. If our quality sorting explanation
is valid, then a narrowing of black-white skill differences will be necessary to weaken what is now a
strong negative correlation between wages and the racial composition of jobs.35
APPENDIX 1
Construction of the Longitudinal Sample from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Files
Households are included in the CPS for eight months—four months in the survey, followed by
eight months out, followed by four months in. Outgoing rotation groups 4 and 8 (a quarter sample)
are asked earnings supplement questions (earnings, hours, union status, etc.). Individuals potentially
can be identified for the same month in consecutive years; that is, individuals in rotation 4 in year 1
can be matched to records in rotation 8 in year 2. The CPS contains household identification numbers
(ID), but not reliable individual identifiers.
The longitudinal file is created in the following manner. Separate data files are created for
males and females, and for pairs of years (rotation 4:1983 and rotation 8:1984, rotation 4:1984 and
rotation 8:1985, etc.). Within each file, individuals are sorted as appropriate on the basis of ascending
and descending household ID, year, and age. To be considered an acceptable matched pair, a rotation
8 individual has to be matched with a rotation 4 individual with identical household ID, identical
survey month, and an age difference between 0 and 2 (since surveys can occur on different days of the
month, age change need not equal 1). Several passes are necessary because a single household may
contain more than one male or female pair. Checks are provided to insure that only unique matches
are selected. For each rotation 8 individual, the search is made through all rotation 4 individuals with
the same ID to make sure there is only one possible match; the file is resorted in reverse order and
each selected rotation 4 individual is checked to insure a unique rotation 8 match. As uniquely
matched pairs are identified they are removed from the work file. Incorrect changes in the variables
marital status, veteran status, race, and education (e.g., a change in schooling other than 0 or 1, a
change from married to never married, etc.) are used to delete "bad" observations in households where
there are multiple observations and ages too close to separate matched pairs. Several passes at the
data are made. In households where two pairs of individuals could be separated based on a 1 year but36
not the 0 to 2 year age change, a 1 year criterion is used. If a unique pair cannot be identified based
on these criteria, they are not included in the data set (e.g., four observations with two identical pairs,
or three individuals with two possible matches using the 0 to 2 age change criterion).
The match rate of earners in the longitudinal analysis is just under two-thirds. That is, two-
thirds of rotation 4 workers in year 1 are found employed in year 2, or two-thirds of rotation 8
workers in year 2 are found employed in year 1. The principal reasons that matches cannot be made
are if a household moves (thus changing household ID), if an individual moves out of a household, if
an individual is not employed or fails to meet other sample selection criteria in one of the two years,
or if the Census is unable to reinterview a household and/or receive information on the individual.
The match rate here is somewhat lower than the rate of 68.8 percent for the 1987–88 CPS reported by
Card (1992), who uses a broader-based sample and a less-stringent probabilistic matching algorithm
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Peracchi and Welch (1992) analyze attrition rates
among matched March CPS files and conclude that age is the most important determinant of a
successful match. Factors that lessen match probabilities are poor health, low schooling, and not a
household head, while sex and race are unimportant match predictors following control for other
factors.
The sample size for the 1983/4–1991/2 panel is 392,877, 24.4 percent of the size of the
1983–92 levels sample of 1,611,829. The difference in sample sizes between the cross-sectional and
longitudinal analyses can be approximated as follows. Because the unit of observation in the panel is
the pair of observations in adjacent years, the potential sample size is initially cut in half. Since we do
not match the half of the 1983 sample that entered the CPS in 1982, or the half of the 1992 sample
that exited the CPS in 1993, the potential sample is reduced by a further 10 percent (i.e., 90 percent of
the full 1983–92 sample is in for two years). A 100 percent match rate of workers between adjacent
years would produce a sample for each period half as large as the corresponding cross-sections. We37
achieve a match rate of about 63 percent. Finally, sample sizes are reduced further to roughly half the
normal size for the 1984/5 panel and to one-quarter for 1985/6, owing to changes in CPS sampling
that did not allow matching on the basis of household I.D.
* Hence the combined multiplier relating
the size of the longitudinal sample to the initial full sample is about .24; i.e., .50 x .90 x .63 x .86 =
.24, where .86 is the ratio (9.0-7.75)/9.0, with the numerator representing the "loss" of panels for
1984/5 plus 1985/6.
*The CPS ran a test sample from July–September 1985 in order to implement new population
weights. Rotation 4 households interviewed in July 1984 through September 1985 were not
reinterviewed a year later in 1985 and 1986.3839
APPENDIX 2
Regression Coefficients, Expanded Wage Models, 1983–92 CPS ORG
Black White Black White
Variables Males Males Females Females
lnB -.0293 (.0042) -.0478 (.0010) -.0176 (.0035) -.0305 (.0011)
Individual Characteristics:
Schooling .0342 (.0007) .0442 (.0002) .0395 (.0007) .0426 (.0003)
Experience .0180 (.0004) .0258 (.0001) .0140 (.0003) .0152 (.0001)
Exper/100 -.0248 (.0008) -.0407 (.0003) -.0197 (.0007) -.0252 (.0003)
Union .1615 (.0037) .1581 (.0013) .1371 (.0033) .1513 (.0015)
Part-time -.1480 (.0052) -.1660 (.0019) -.0968 (.0036) -.0994 (.0012)
Married w/spouse .0815 (.0040) .1271 (.0013) .0270 (.0033) .0316 (.0014)
Other ever married .0496 (.0051) .0727 (.0019) .0220 (.0036) .0293 (.0016)
Hispanic -.0828 (.0125) -.1081 (.0019) -.0203 (.0115) -.0500 (.0021)
Federal .0322 (.0076) .0132 (.0030) .0397 (.0063) .0238 (.0034)
State .0012 (.0084) -.0651 (.0027) -.0170 (.0059) -.0423 (.0026)
Local -.0203 (.0060) -.0839 (.0023) -.0202 (.0049) -.0717 (.0021)
Large metro area .0967 (.0035) .1311 (.0011) .1086 (.0030) .1320 (.0011)
Job Characteristics:
DOT-GED .0380 (.0050) .0014 (.0015) .0382 (.0043) .0384 (.0016)
DOT-SVP .0167 (.0024) .0248 (.0006) .0125 (.0022) .0130 (.0007)
OCC-Training .1708 (.0173) .1093 (.0050) .1274 (.0153) .3471 (.0055)
OCC-Computer .1633 (.0124) .2173 (.0037) .2020 (.0094) .1075 (.0035)
OCC-Job Tenure .0014 (.0010) -.0013 (.0003) .0168 (.0010) .0062 (.0004)
OCC-Part-time -.1295 (.0168) -.1883 (.0059) .0419 (.0131) -.0338 (.0053)
DOT-Enviroment -.0017 (.0050) .0235 (.0016) -.0540 (.0070) .0016 (.0032)
DOT-Hazards -.0208 (.0105) .0238 (.0032) .1805 (.0132) .0913 (.0052)
DOT-Physical .0265 (.0035) .0031 (.0010) .0177 (.0031) .0506 (.0010)
DOT-Strength -.0192 (.0045) -.0224 (.0016) .0197 (.0043) .0154 (.0016)
OCC-Female -.0719 (.0094) -.0705 (.0033) -.0715 (.0077) -.1161 (.0030)
IND-Big Firm .1688 (.0092) .1842 (.0029) .1799 (.0074) .1776 (.0027)
IND-Union .1622 (.0137) .0538 (.0045) .0521 (.0122) -.0457 (.0048)
Region (8) yes yes yes yes
Industry (13) yes yes yes yes
Occupation (5) yes yes yes yes
Year (9) yes yes yes yes
R
2 .4666 .5043 .4979 .4704
N 72,388 777,036 86,415 680,990
Standard errors are in parentheses. The omitted reference group is full-time, nonunion, non-Hispanic, never
married, private-sector worker in the northeast, professional or managerial occupation, agricultural sector, in
1983. Tables 2 and 3 provide definitions for all variables.4041
Endnotes
1See Hirsch and Schumacher for a discussion of previous literature. The relationship between
wages and racial composition is examined empirically by Sorensen (1989) and England (1992),
although it is not the focus of their work, and by Ragan and Tremblay (1988) in a study of employee
discrimination. Earlier papers by Chiswick (1973) and Reich (1978) have a different emphasis, but
provide discussion and evidence related to racial composition and the income distribution.
2Other variants of a quality sorting model can be developed. A search model might suggest that
voluntary job switches will result in increased wages regardless of whether B increases or decreases.
Such a pattern should be particularly evident among young workers, for whom job shopping is most
important. And one should not observe such a pattern where job switching is not voluntary (we
examine exogenous job switching using the Displaced Worker Surveys). Because the simple search
model cannot account for our basic pattern of results, we do not pursue this approach. A more
complex search model (e.g., Jovanovic, 1979), in which the productivity of heterogeneous workers
only becomes known to employers over time (i.e., with experience), does not lead to unambiguous
implications about the relationship of wages and B.
3Although not a focus of this study, it is important to note that labor market equilibria evident
today have a historical basis. Racial discrimination and imperfect information about individual
productivities interacted to lead to equilibria in which jobs with a high B have lower measured and
unmeasured skills. Black workers brought to the labor market a significantly lower quantity and
quality of human capital (Card and Krueger, 1992), faced substantial employment barriers (Higgs,
1977; Margo, 1990; Wright, 1986; Heckman and Payner, 1989), and were relegated to jobs typically
providing low levels of job training. White workers in predominantly black labor markets were likely
to be low skilled. For example, Wright (1986, p. 103) quotes a white planter from the late 1800s who
preferred black labor because "the class of white men that offer for hire out there as a rule are a very
sorry class of men." As discrimination lessened, labor market equilibria remained in which there was
an inverse relationship between the productivity (or wages) and B. Gill (1989) provides more recent42
evidence indicating larger differences for blacks than whites between desired and actual occupational
attainment. This finding is consistent with some maintenance of racial barriers to occupational
attainment.
4The Aigner-Cain model treats human capital endowments as predetermined. Lundberg and Startz
(1983) show that statistical discrimination leads to a suboptimal level of human capital investment for
more able members of low-productivity groups.
5The CPS ORG files are not provided as public use tapes by the Bureau of the Census or ICPSR.
They are made available through the Data Services Group at the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
6Silber (1989) compares the Duncan index to alternative indices of segregation. The Duncan index
and B can be sensitive to changes in occupational definition. Because the CPS occupation codes
changed significantly beginning in 1983 (with the use of the 1980 rather than the 1970 Census of
Population codes), numbers for 1973–82 and 1983–92 are not strictly comparable. There appears to
be no significant break in the series between 1982 and 1983, however. Beginning in 1992, the CPS
adopted the 1990 Census of Population codes. These changes were modest and we were able to
construct time-consistent occupational categories for 1983–92 (six small occupational categories were
merged into larger categories, reducing the number of potential occupations from 503 in 1983–91 to
497 in 1983–92). Time-consistent codes are used in all the regression analyses.
7GED is a 1–6 index of general educational development and SVP measures years required for
proficiency in an occupation.
8In work not shown, we estimate models with B calculated separately for workers in the South and
non-South (Hirsch and Schumacher define it within more-aggregated occupation-by-industry-by-region
cells). Estimates using regionally disaggregated measures of B correspond more closely to the
proportion of black workers at an individual’s work site. But the explanatory power of such measures
is no greater than when B is defined on a nationwide basis, and estimates of racial composition
coefficients differ more substantially across sectors (e.g., South versus non-South) in what we believe
is a misleading fashion. We conclude that the racial composition effect is statistically driven by43
nationwide occupational differences in the proportion of employees who are black, consistent with the
thesis that B serves primarily as an occupational skill index.
9Table 1 provides mean values of B. Increases of 10 percent in B for black and white workers
correspond to changes of approximately 1.5 and 1 percentage points, respectively.
10We thank Andrew Weiss for suggesting this point.
11The nominal minimum wage was $3.35 from January 1983 through March 1990, $3.80 from
April 1990 through March 1991, and $4.25 after April 1991. The percentage of workers excluded
from each group is as follows: black males, 9.8 percent; white males, 5.1 percent; black females, 14.5
percent; and white females, 10.9 percent.
12Bound and Johnson (1992), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), and Krueger (1993) provide
evidence that changes in the wage structure are consistent with technological changes and demand
shifts leading to increased return to observed and unobserved skills.
13Workers reporting a change in occupation only, or in occupation and industry, have changes in B
that are lower than would occur if changes in occupation are randomly assigned. Thus, measurement
error may not be too serious even when occupation is misclassified. This is in contrast to the
frequently discussed case of mismeasurement of union status, where workers are assigned values of 0
or 1.
14We thank Jay Stewart of the BLS for informing us about occupational coding. He also notes
that BLS analysts have concluded that retrospective surveys such as the March CPS may understate
true occupational change.
15Addition of B to the wage equation reduces the unexplained differential for males by 12.2
percent and for females by 23.8 percent. Hirsch and Schumacher (1992) provide explicit evidence on
B and wage-gap estimates.
16It is worth comparing the conclusions here on racial composition to those reached in studies of
gender composition (e.g., Johnson and Solon, 1986; Sorensen, 1989). As is widely known, both men
and women earn less in predominantly female occupations. Macpherson and Hirsch (forthcoming),
however, conclude that from two-thirds to three-fourths of the gender composition effect can be44
accounted for by occupational characteristics measuring training and job attachment and by
unmeasured worker-specific differences in tastes and skills.
17Rivera-Batiz (1992) and O’Neill (1990) provide direct evidence that racial differences in ability
account for some of the racial gap in employment and wages, respectively.45
References
Arrow, Kenneth. 1973. "The Theory of Discrimination." Pp. 3–33 in Discrimination in Labor Markets, ed. Orley
Ashenfelter and Albert Rees. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Becker, Gary S. 1971. The Economics of Discrimination, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago.
Bergmann, Barbara R. 1971. "The Effect on White Incomes of Discrimination in Employment." Journal of Political
Economy 79(2): 294–313.
Bound, John and Richard B. Freeman. 1992. "What Went Wrong? The Erosion of Relative Earnings and
Employment among Young Black Men in the 1980s." Quarterly Journal of
Economics 107(1): 201–32.
Bound, John and George Johnson. 1992. "Changes in the Structure of Wages in the 1980’s: An Evaluation of
Alternative Explanations." American Economic Review 82(3): 371–92.
Bound, John and Alan B. Krueger. 1991. "The Extent of Measurement Error in Longitudinal Earnings Data: Do
Two Wrongs Make a Right?" Journal of Labor Economics 9(1): 1–24.
Cain, Glen G. 1986. "The Economic Analysis of Labor Market Discrimination: A Survey." Pp. 693–785 in
Handbook of Labor Economics, ed. Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Card, David. 1992. "The Effect of Unions on the Distribution of Wages: Redistribution or Relabelling?" National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 4195, October.
Card, David and Alan B. Krueger. 1992. "School Quality and Black-White Relative Earnings: A Direct
Assessment." Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(1): 151–200.
Card, David and Thomas Lemieux. 1993. "Wage Dispersion, Returns to Skill, and Black-White Wage Differentials."
Working Paper no. 312, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University,
February.
Chiswick, Barry R. 1973. "Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market: A Test of Alternative Hypotheses." Journal
of Political Economy 81(6): 1330–52.
Dickens, William T. and Brian A. Ross. 1984. "Consistent Estimation Using Data from More than One Sample."
National Bureau of Economic Research, Technical Working Paper no. 33.
England, Paula. 1992. Comparable Worth: Theories and Evidence. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.46
Freeman, Richard B. 1984. "Longitudinal Analyses of the Effects of Trade Unions." Journal of Labor Economics
2(1): 1–26.
Gibbons, Robert and Lawrence Katz. 1992. "Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-Industry Wage Differentials?"
Review of Economic Studies 59(3): 515–35.
Gill, Andrew M. 1989. "The Role of Discrimination in Determining Occupational Structure." Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 42(4): 610–23.
Heckman, James and Brook Payner. 1989. "Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the
Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina." American Economic
Review 79(1): 138–77.
Higgs, Robert. 1977. Competition and Coercion: Blacks in the American Economy, 1865–1914. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Hirsch, Barry T. and Edward J. Schumacher. 1992. "Labor Earnings, Discrimination, and the Racial Composition of
Jobs." Journal of Human Resources 27(4): 602–28.
Hwang, Hae-shin, W. Robert Reed, and Carlton Hubbard. 1992. "Compensating Wage Differentials and Unobserved
Productivity." Journal of Political Economy 100 (August): 835–58.
Johnson, George and Gary Solon. 1986. "Estimates of the Direct Effects of Comparable Worth Policy." American
Economic Review 76(6): 1117–25.
Jovanovic, Boyan. 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover." Journal of Political Economy 87(5, pt. 1):
972–90.
Juhn, Chinhui, Kevin M. Murphy, and Brooks Pierce. 1993. "Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns to Skill."
Journal of Political Economy 101(3): 410–42.
Krueger, Alan B. 1993. "How Computers Have Changed the Wage Structure: Evidence from Microdata,
1984–1989." Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(1): 33–60.
Lang, Kevin. 1986. "A Language Theory of Discrimination." Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(2): 363–82.
Lundberg, Shelly J. and Richard Startz. 1983. "Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor
Markets." American Economic Review 73(3): 340–47.
Macpherson, David A. and Barry T. Hirsch. Forthcoming. "Wages and Gender Composition: Why Do Women’s
Jobs Pay Less?" Journal of Labor Economics.
Margo, Robert. 1990. Race and Schooling in the South, 1880–1950. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.47
Mellow, Wesley and Hal Sider. 1983. "Accuracy of Response in Labor Market Surveys: Evidence and
Implications." Journal of Labor Economics 1(4): 331–44.
O’Neill, June. 1990. "The Role of Human Capital in Earnings Differences between Black and White Men." Journal
of Economic Perspectives 4(4): 25–45.
Peracchi, Franco and Finis Welch. 1992. "How Representative Are Matched Cross Sections? Evidence from the
Current Population Survey." C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York
University, Economic Research Report no. 92-53, October.
Ragan, James F., Jr. and Carol Horton Tremblay. 1988. "Testing for Employee Discrimination by Race and Sex."
Journal of Human Resources 23(1): 123–37.
Reich, Michael. 1978. "Who Benefits from Racism? The Distribution among Whites of Gains and Losses from
Racial Inequality." Journal of Human Resources 13(4): 524–44.
Rivera-Batiz, Francisco L. 1992. "Quantitative Literacy and the Likelihood of Employment among Young Adults."
Journal of Human Resources 27(2): 313–28.
Silber, Jacques G. 1989. "On the Measurement of Employment Segregation." Economics Letters 30(3): 237–43.
Sorensen, Elaine. 1989. "Measuring the Effect of Occupational Sex and Race Composition on Earnings." Pp. 49–69
in Pay Equity: Empirical Inquiries, eds. R. T. Michael, H. I. Hartmann, and B.
O’Farrell. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Whatley, Warren C. 1990. "Getting a Foot in the Door: ‘Learning,’ State Dependence, and the Racial Integration of
Firms." Journal of Economic History 50(1): 43–66.
Wright, Gavin. 1986. Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War. New
York: Basic Books.